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Abstract
There are various researches on accruals-based 
earnings management. The earnings management can 
be done by accruals or real activities or both of them. 
A few studies are conducted on the survey of the rela-
tionship between earnings management via real activi-
ties and managers’ error in earnings per share forecast. 
The present study aimed to answer the question “Is 
there any association between the criteria of earnings 
management based on real activities, abnormal cash 
flow from operations, abnormal production expenses 
and abnormal discretionary expenses with the manag-
ers’ error in earnings per share forecast?” To do this, a 
sample of 96 companies in stock exchange market was 
selected and the data of 2005-2011 were extracted. The 
results of the study showed that real activities manage-
ment to increase (reduce) the real earnings to achieve 
the forecast earnings leads to reduction (increase) of 
the abnormal cash flow from operations and abnormal 
discretionary expenses compared to the normal con-
ditions. In addition, there was no significant relation 
between abnormal production expenses with the man-
agers’ error in earnings per share forecast.
Keywords: Real earnings management, Abnor-
mal cash flows from operations, Abnormal product 
expenses, Abnormal discretionary expenses, Man-
agers error in earnings per share forecast. 
Introduction 
With the growth of business and trading in the world 
and specialization of management of the companies, 
the management is separated from ownership and the 
companies now are managed by professional managers, 
aware of the complex economic and financial affairs. 
The owners give their wealth to the managers and to 
make decision in some cases as keeping or selling the 
investment and evaluation of the tasks of the managers 
to re-select or replace them, ask the managers to pres-
ent the information and explain about his performance. 
Thus, accounting information meet the major parts of 
the demands or information of the decision makers.
Indeed, accounting is information system of busi-
ness units presenting financial information. Most of 
accounting information is reflected in basic financial 
statements and most of the information needs of the 
decision makers including equity, potential investors, 
credit providers, financial analysts and other users are 
met by financial statements. One of the basic financial 
statements that are taken into attention is profit and loss 
report. This report presents the performance of busi-
ness unit in a financial period. The researches in earn-
ings management showed two main methods of earn-
ings management. The managers of the companies can 
manage earnings via accruals manipulation and real 
activities manipulation. Most of earnings management 
literature emphasizes on accruals-based earnings man-
agement. However, a few studies are conducted on real 
earnings management and its effect on business unit 
performance. Real earnings management is with the 
change in timing or structuring of real activities of the 
company. Therefore, the researchers in the studies on 
real earnings management identified abnormal levels of 
business unit activities (e.g.Healy and Wahlen., 1999). 
The researches on real earnings management such 
as Roychowdhury (2006) and Elshafie et al. (2010) in-
dicated the real earnings management (Elshafie et al., 
2010). The present study aimed to evaluate the relation-
ship between real earnings management and managers 
error in earnings per share forecast. The criteria of real 
earnings management were selected in accordance with 
Cohen & Zarowin (2010) study. The relationship be-
tween real earnings management criteria and managers 
error in earnings per share forecast was investigated via 
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regression analysis. Later, the theoretical basics of the 
study, review of literature, model and study variables and 
the results of hypotheses test are explained.
Theoretical basics of the study
One of the goals of financial reporting is peri-
odical summary of financial performance informa-
tion of the companies. The beneficiaries of the com-
pany apply earnings (as the main aspect of financial 
statements and additional notes) to evaluate man-
agement supervision duty. The beneficiaries apply 
“earnings” values to measure management perfor-
mance, determining reward price, future evaluation 
of the company (for the decisions of resources al-
location) and company evaluation. The key role of 
earnings in reward contracts and evaluation of per-
formance is an incentive for earnings management. 
Many researches show that managers use their 
accounting power (estimation and selection of ac-
counting) to manipulate accruals and finally earn-
ings. Earnings besides accruals component has cash 
component. Earnings management is also possible 
via earnings cash component. Indeed, the researches 
on earnings management documented both earnings 
management based on accounting items (via accru-
als) and earnings management based on real activities 
(real activities manipulation in business). One of the 
definitions of earnings management is “a purposeful 
intervention in the external financial reporting pro-
cess, with the aim of achieving some private benefits. 
Thus, earnings management can be occurred in each 
time of external disclosure processes with various 
forms. Minor extension of this definition would in-
clude earnings real management. This type of earn-
ings management is accomplished via timing financ-
ing decisions and investment and to alter the reported 
earnings or some subsets of it (e.g. Schipper, 1989). 
The main difference between discretionary ac-
cruals management and real activities manipulation is 
the scheduling of earnings management. Compared 
to earnings management based on accounting values, 
any manipulation in real activities should be occurred 
in a period of year. The real activities manipulation oc-
curs when the managers forecast indicates that earnings 
failed to meet their required goals unless they lead to the 
affairs rising from the normal procedure of the company 
or when other factors (stringent accounting standards) 
restrict discretionary accruals managements. To fulfill 
the earnings goals, the managers can wait to the end of 
year and apply discretionary accruals for reported earn-
ings management. This method compromises the risk 
that the earnings required for manipulation is greater 
than existing discretionary accruals, because the dis-
cretion in accruals is limited by generally accepted ac-
counting principles (e.g. Chapman-Craig, 2011).
Similar to earnings management, there are two 
different approaches in relation to forecast earnings 
in theoretical literature of accounting as signaling ap-
proach and management opportunistic behavior Ap-
proach. In accordance with signaling approach, man-
agers as the people mostly being aware of the current 
and future condition of the company, signal their infor-
mation to the people outside the organization and they 
reduce information asymmetry. On the other hand, in 
accordance with opportunistic behavior approach, the 
managers’ benefit from the asymmetry between them-
selves and people outside the organization and they try 
to transfer the benefits to themselves.  Opportunistic 
behavior approach is based on agency theory and the 
contrast between the benefits of managers and inves-
tors. The most recognized outcome of management 
opportunistic behavior in relation to forecast earnings 
is investors’ perception management or investors’ ex-
pectation management and the managers manage the 
beliefs and expectations of the investors as it is good for 
them. One of the requirements of stock exchange is 
earnings forecast by managers. There are various mod-
els for earnings forecast. The forecasts being done by 
professionals including analysts were more exact than 
the forecasts made by these models but the precision of 
the forecast of these people is affected by various fac-
tors. Also, forecast precision in various countries can be 
affected by various factors as tax system or accounting 
principles. One of the tools of interaction of the manag-
ers of the companies with market is presenting the in-
formation about company earnings forecast, by which 
the companies can affect the market behavior. Most of 
the analysts and investors take their decisions based on 
existing information and the significance of earnings 
forecast by managers is more compared to the current 
earnings and capital book value and the earnings pre-
dicted by managers are important criteria in evaluation 
of the companies and effectiveness on stock price of the 
companies. It should be expected that stock company 
managers should be careful in their forecast.
An earnings per share forecast is one of the impor-
tant principles of investment and in most case is one of 
the main factors of share selection methods. This is-
sue is important for both the users and provider. The 
manager attempts to estimate future earnings per share 
as leading to increasing the trust of the users and con-
siders its user as a criterion for performance evaluation 
and weak forecast estimation indicates performance 
weakness. If the management can not cover the fore-
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cast earnings, it attempts to manage earnings to fulfill 
the pre-defined goals (goal earnings) and as earnings 
management based on accounting values is mostly 
taken into the attention of the auditors and inspectors 
of the company, the managers attempt to achieve their 
goals by changing the real activities of the company. 
The management by changing the sale policies (pre-
senting the price discount to the customers-reduction of 
products price or increasing the credit period) increases 
the sale and show better earnings and performance. If 
the mangers present discount in the next periods, the 
company sale is confronted with some threats and the 
change in the sale policies is effective on cash flow from 
operations and earnings of company. In addition, the 
managers can influence the current period earnings via 
changing the production policies as overproduction can 
offset the fixed overhead expenses over large number of 
units and the cost of the production cost of each unit is 
less than the normal condition and this increases profit 
margin. In other words, by this method, a part of fixed 
overhead expenses of the period in the form of goods 
inventory at the end of the period is transferred to the 
next period and the share of sold goods during the peri-
od from fixed overhead expenses is relatively lower than 
normal condition. Thus, if sale income of each unit is 
fixed, the reduction of cost of each good increases the 
operating earnings margin. This analysis is true when 
inventory holding expenses (being created by changing 
production policy) is less than reduction in production 
price of sold units in the period.
In another method, the expenses under the 
control of the management are decreased and in-
creased. The expenses as “Research and Develop-
ment expenses” and “general, administrative and 
sale expenses” are classified in the form of discre-
tionary expenses. The companies by altering the 
discretionary expenses change the expenses and re-
ported earnings in accordance with their goals.
If a manager is deviated from optimized level of 
real operating activities and is engaged in real activi-
ties management-in accordance with his goals- the 
company is involved in economic outcomes in long-
term. The real activities manipulation affects the 
operating performance of the company indirectly 
because the manager is inclined to consider current 
period earnings at the price of losing cash flow. By 
considering only one period, income or earnings-
based accounting ratios can motivate the managers 
to have a short-term view. For example, current ex-
penses such as Research and Development expenses 
reducing current earnings and it doesn’t lead to gen-
erating income to some future periods.
Review of literature 
The studies showed that the companies’ manag-
ers to avoid the loss report and meeting the predictions 
and expectations of the investors tried to manage or 
manipulate earnings. Earnings can be managed by two 
forms: Via manipulation of accounting accruals (accru-
als earnings management) and via the change in eco-
nomic events (real earnings management). Account-
ing values-based earnings management (discretionary 
accruals) is occurred when management manipulates 
reported earnings by allowable accounting discretion. 
Real activities-based earnings management includes 
the management attempt to change in the reported 
earnings via altering timing and real business activities. 
In other words, the companies use earnings real man-
agement as an alternative for accounting and accruals 
items. The unique feature of earnings real management 
is that via manipulation, real business activities such as 
research and development expenses, investment, pro-
duction, sale and assets saving, etc are done. Earnings 
real management imposes real cots to the company and 
reduces the company value directly. The real activities 
manipulation has negative effect on earnings and fu-
ture cash flow of the company (e.g. Ewert and Wagen-
hofer., 2005). Some researches as Healy and Wahlen 
(1999), Dechow and Skinner (2002) and Roychowd-
hury (2006) referred to some methods as facilitating sale 
via giving discount, change the table of sending goods, 
reduction of discretionary expenses such as research 
and development expenses and overproduction as real 
earnings management. For example, the managers give 
price discounts to improve sale by it. The managers con-
sider discount in sale at the end of fiscal year to increase 
sale. The increase sale volume is eliminated when the 
company again determines the old prices. Indeed, this 
transfers future profitability to current period. Thus, fu-
ture profitability is damaged by sale management.
Real activities manipulation methods as reduc-
ing sale price of the products to increase the sale or 
reduction of discretionary expenses in economic crisis 
are the optimal methods helping the managers. But if 
the managers are interested in the mentioned meth-
ods widely and based on abnormal features, they are 
inclined to real earnings management. Although the 
managers by such activities can achieve their earnings 
in short-term, they cannot increase the company value 
in long-term (Bartov et al., 2002). The studies showed 
that the companies in the three months at the end of 
year, fulfill earnings goals via real activities manipula-
tion such as price reduction for temporary accelera-
tion of sale. Also, the companies show more reaction 
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in competitive situations to the earnings management 
motivations (e.g. Chapman-Craig, 2011).
Thomas and Zhang (2002) presented some evi-
dences about real activities manipulation via overpro-
duction. In other words, managers overproduce for sale 
and normal level of goods inventory and decrease cost of 
goods sold and reported earnings is increased. Although 
this solution improves the profitability margin, the com-
pany should pay the expenses of warehousing and hold-
ing and normal level of cash flow from operation of the 
company is reduced (e.g. Thomas and Zhang, 2002). 
Graham et al., (2005) in an interview with executive 
managers of 400 USA companies found evidences that 
the managers to manage reported earnings are inclined 
to manipulate real activities. For example, 80% of the 
managers are prepared to reduce the research and de-
velopment and advertisement expenses to achieve the 
target earnings. More than half of them are inclined to 
postpone the new projects to achieve the required earn-
ings even this reduces the company value.
The managers at the beginning of each year 
predict earnings per share. When they cannot ful-
fill the presented forecast to the users by their real 
performance, they attempt to cover their forecast 
via real activities management (in other words, they 
reduce their forecast error by it). Thus, the manag-
ers to achieve the above goal, manipulate real activi-
ties. Some methods as rapid sale via giving discount, 
considering long credit period for selling the prod-
ucts, reduction of discretionary expenses as research 
and development and overproduction expenses are 
real earnings management methods. Based on the 
mentioned literature, it is expected that there is 
an association between real earnings management 
and managers error in forecasting the earnings per 
share. In Iran, a few studies are done on real activi-
ties management. The present study evaluated the 
relationship between real earnings management and 
managers error in earnings per share forecast. In this 
study, compared to the local previous studies, real 
earnings management criterion was applied instead 
of accruals-based earnings management to study the 
managers’ error in earnings per share forecast.
Study hypotheses 
Based on the review of literature, abnormal cash 
flow from operations, abnormal production expenses 
and abnormal discretionary expenses variables were 
applied as real earnings management criteria. Also, 
the forecast earnings were compared with real earn-
ings as the managers’ error in earnings per share fore-
cast. Thus, the study hypotheses are as following:
Hypothesis 1: There is an association between 
abnormal cash flow from operations and managers 
error in earnings per share forecast.
Hypothesis 2: There is an association between 
abnormal production expense and managers error 
in earnings per share forecast.
Hypothesis 3: There is an association between 
abnormal discretionary expenses and managers er-
ror in earnings per share forecast.
Methodology
Study population and study sample
The study population of the study was all the com-
panies listed on TSE during 2005-2011. In this study, 
sampling was done by systematic elimination method. 
The sample of the study including all the companies 
listed on TSE met the following inclusion criteria:
1. The fiscal year of the companies leads to the 
end of Esfand each year.
2. They didn’t change their fiscal year during the 
study period. 
3. They are not included in the investment, 
holding, banks and insurance companies with dif-
ferent structures with other companies.
4. Their financial statement information is com-
pletely and continually available since 2005.
Then, the selected sample of 96 companies 
(672 years-company) was formed. 
Study method
The present study is applied in terms of aim. 
This study is descriptive-correlation design as it in-
vestigates the existing condition on one hand and on 
the other hand determines the relation between the 
variables by regression analysis. The statistical mod-
els in the present study were regression models. In 
the present study, dependent variable is managers’ 
error in earnings per share forecast and independent 
variables were abnormal cash flow from operations, 
abnormal production expenses and abnormal dis-
cretionary expenses. Later, computation methods 
of independent variables are explained. Also, to test 
the hypotheses, pooled data were used. To deter-
mined the estimation method of the models (pooled 
or panel data), F-Limer test was used and if panel 
method was applied, Hausman test was used to se-
lect fixed effects or random effects. The analysis of 
the results was done by T-student, F-Fisher and 
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coefficient of determination tests. The information 
of the applied variables was collected via annual fi-
nancial statementsof the companies listed on TSE 
and by databases “Tadbirpardaz” and “Rahavard 
Novin”. To do the calculations and preparing the 
data and their analysis, Excel and Eviews software 
was applied.
The applied variables and model
Measuring abnormal cash flow from operations
In this study, based on Cohen & Zarowin (2010) 
study, Model (1) was used to estimate the abnormal cash 
flow from operations as the model residual is considered 
as abnormal cash flow from operations (ABCASH).
i t i t i t
i t
i t 1 i t 1 i t 1 i t 1
CFO Sales Sales1 0 1 2
TA TA TA TA
α α α ε
− − − −
∆
= + + +
                                    
(Model 1)
CFO
it
: Cash flow from operations of company i 
at the end of year t
TA
it-1 
: Total assets of company i at the end of 
year t-1
Sales
it
: Sale of company i during year t
ΔSales
it
: The changes of sale of company i at the 
end of year t equal to sale at year t minus sale in year t-1
ε
it
: Model residual
Measuring abnormal production expenses
Similar to Cohen & Zarowin (2010) study, ab-
normal production is estimated by model (2) as the 
model residual is considered as abnormal produc-
tion expenses (ABCOST):
i t i t i t i t 1
i t
i t 1 i t 1 i t 1 i t 1 i t 1
PROD Sales Sales Sales1 0 1 2 3
TA TA TA TA TA
α α α α δ−
− − − − −
∆ ∆
= + + + +
                      
(Model 2)
PROD
it
: Production expenses of company i at 
the end of year t equal to the cost of sold goods plus 
the changes in goods inventory.
ΔSales
it-1
:The changes of sale of company i at 
the end of year t-1 equal to the difference of the sale 
between year t-1 and t-2
δ
it
: Model residual
Measuring abnormal discretionary expenses 
According to Cohen & Zarowin (2010) study, 
abnormal discretionary expense is estimated by 
model (3) and model residual is considered as ab-
normal discretionary expense criterion (ABEXP).
i t i t
i t
i t 1 i t 1 i t 1
DISEXP Sales1 0 1
TA TA TA
α α λ
− − −
= + +
    
(Model 3)
 
DISEXP
it
: Discretionary expenses of company i 
at the end of year t equal to the administrative, pub-
lic and sale expenses.
λ
it
: Model residual 
The hypotheses test
To test the study hypotheses, regression model 
by pooled data was applied:
DEPS
it 
= α + β X
it
 + ε
it
                             (Model 4)
DEPS
it
:It indicated the difference between real 
earnings per share with the forecast earnings per share
X
it
: It indicates real earnings management crite-
ria (abnormal cash flow from operations, abnormal 
production expense and abnormal discretionary ex-
pense)
β: The coefficient of real earnings management 
criteria for the residual values of models 1-3
Results
Hypothesis test requires normality of dependent 
variables, consistency of variance and autocorrela-
tion. In case of the lack of consistency, the results 
are not reliable and this leads to false inferences. Af-
ter being sure of establishment of regression hypoth-
eses, the study hypotheses are tested.
The study of the first hypothesis
Based on this hypothesis, it is expected that 
there is an association between abnormal cash flow 
from operations (as real earnings management) with 
managers’ error in earnings per share forecast. Be-
fore estimating each of the models, it is required by 
F-Limer test and Hausman test (panel data), their 
estimation method is defined. The results of the 
above test showed that the applied method to esti-
mate model (1) was panel method (random effects). 
The results of regression model estimation (1) in 
Table 1 are as followings:
The estimation results showed that estimation 
coefficient of abnormal cash flow from operations 
variable (ABCASH) was negative. As t test probabil-
ity is less than 5%, this relation is significant statis-
tically. In other words, there is an inverse and sig-
nificant relation between abnormal cash flow from 
operations (criterion of real earnings management) 
and managers’ error in earnings per share forecast. 
The coefficient of determination showed that the in-
dependent variables can explain 19% of the changes 
of dependent variable. As F-statistic is less than 5%, 
whole model is significant statistically in this case.
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Table 1. Estimation of regression model (1)
t-test probability t-test statistics Standard error Estimation coefficient Variables
0.067 -1.837 2.874 -5.279 C
0.000 -3.549 18.734 -66.479 ABCASH
Durbin-Watson 12.557 statistics F 0.19 Coefficient of determination
1.674 0.000 probability F 0.17
Adjusted coefficient  
of determination
The study of second hypothesis
Based on this hypothesis, it is expected that there 
is an association between abnormal production ex-
penses (as real earnings management criterion) with 
managers’ error in earnings per share forecast. Be-
fore estimating each of the models, it is required by 
F-Limer test and Hausman test (panel data), their 
estimation method is defined. The results of the 
above test showed that the applied method to esti-
mate model (2) was pooled method (without fixed 
effects). The results of regression model estimation 
(2) in Table 2 are as followings:
Table 2. Estimation of regression model (2)
t-test probability t-test statistics Standard error Estimation coefficient Variables
0.052 -1.949 2.681 -5.224 C
0.075 1.821 8.5925 15.647 ABCOST
Durbin-Watson 3.316 statistics F 0.093 Coefficient of determination
1.588 0.048 probability F 0.081
Adjusted coefficient  
of determination
The estimation results showed that F statis-
tic probability is less than 5%, thus whole model 
is significant statistically. In addition, estima-
tion coefficient of abnormal production expense 
variable (ABCOST) was positive. As t test prob-
ability is greater than 5%, this relation is not sig-
nificant statistically. In other words, there is no 
significant relation between abnormal produc-
tion expense (criterion of real earnings manage-
ment) and managers’ error in earnings per share 
forecast. 
The study of third hypothesis
Based on this hypothesis, it is expected that there 
is an association between abnormal discretionary ex-
penses (as real earnings management criterion) with 
managers’ error in earnings per share forecast. Before 
estimating each of the models, it is required by F-Lim-
er test and Hausman test (panel data), their estimation 
method is defined. The results of the above test showed 
that the applied method to estimate model (3) was pan-
el method (with fixed effects). The results of regression 
model estimation (3) in Table 3 are as followings:
Table 3. Estimation of regression model (3)
t-test probability t-test statistics Standard error Estimation coefficient Variables
0.083 -1.735 2.992 -5.190 C
0.009 -2.640 88.557 -233.807 ABEXP
Durbin-Watson 6.980 statistics F 0.088 Coefficient of determination
1.636 0.008 Probability F 0.080
Adjusted coefficient  
of determination
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The estimation results showed that estimation 
coefficient of abnormal discretionary expense vari-
able (ABEXP) was negative. As t test probability is 
less than 5%, this relation is significant statistically. 
In other words, there is an inverse and significant re-
lation between abnormal discretionary expense (cri-
terion of real earnings management) and managers’ 
error in earnings per share forecast. The coefficient 
of determination showed that the independent vari-
ables can explain 08% of the changes of dependent 
variable. As F-statistic is less than 5%, whole model 
is significant statistically in this case.
Conclusions
In the present study, the relationship between real 
earnings management with managers error in earnings 
per share forecast was investigated. Abnormal cash flow, 
abnormal production expense and abnormal discretion-
ary expense were applied as real earnings management 
criteria. Three hypotheses are considered in accordance 
with the study purpose and 96 companies listed in TSE 
were studied. The results of the investigation of the first 
and third hypothesis test showed that there is an inverse 
and significant association between abnormal cash flow 
from operations and abnormal discretionary expenses 
with managers’ error in earnings per share forecast. The 
results of the second hypothesis showed that there is no 
significant relation between abnormal production ex-
pense and managers error in earnings per share forecast. 
It can be said that to achieve the pre-defined goals (tar-
get earnings), the manager manage earnings via some 
methods as rapid selling via giving discount, changing 
good delivery table, reduction of discretionary expenses. 
The results of first and third hypotheses of the present 
study were consistent with the results of the study of 
Graham et al., (2005) and Chiman (2011), but results of 
the study of Thomas and Zhang (2002) and Roychowd-
hury et al., (2006) were not consistent with the results of 
the second hypothesis test of the present study. 
As a few studies are done in real earnings man-
agement in Iran, the following recommendations 
can be useful for further study:
1. The study of the relationship between real 
earnings management and error in earnings forecast 
and accruals for the companies their stock is offered 
for the first time in TSE.
2. The study of the effect of real earnings man-
agement on earnings quality and future stock return 
of the companies.
3. The study of the relationship between real 
earnings management and dividend policy.
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